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ABSTRACT
Employees frequently have ideas and opinions on the execution of tasks or on the
organization itself. Yet, sometimes employees remain silent and withhold this valu-
able input from their organizations because they fear experiencing conflict or con-
troversy, causing both performance and employee morale to suffer. This article tests
to what extent such fear of speaking up, referred to as ‘defensive silence,’ is affected
by the extent of successive structural reforms an organization endures. Analyses of
Norwegian Staff Surveys and of a structural reform database show that repetitive
structural reforms affect employee engagement in defensive silence.
KEYWORDS Defensive silence; structural reform history; multi-level analysis
1. Introduction
Employee silence is a pervasive and potentially harmful aspect of organizational life
(Premeaux and Bedeian 2003; Vakola and Bouradas 2005).While it was originally assumed
that a lack of vocalized resistance implies agreement with decisions and with the behaviors
of others, scholars of organizational science have more recently begun to recognize that
silence may be engaged in as a strategic choice (Pinder and Harlos 2001; Van Dyne, Ang,
and Botero 2003). Employees may choose to avoid discussing topics or may withhold
information due to a fear of conflict, reprisals or other harmful consequences, due to
a belief that speaking up is fruitless, or to protect peers and/or the organization (Van Dyne,
Ang, and Botero 2003; Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin 2003; Hassan 2015). Employee
silence, especially when rooted in fear or resignation, may have serious consequences for
public sector organizations (Hassan 2015). Civil servants may avoid raising problems,
issues, and policy proposals in the areas in which they focus when they fear becoming
embroiled in disputes or controversy as a result (De Graaf 2010). For instance, information
withheld from politicians may eventually give rise to issues in parliament while a failure to
disclose imminent policy failures in running organizations may result in the emergence of
various scandals and crises. Internally, failing to address issues regarding management
decisions can create further discontent while wrongfully communicating agreement to an
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organization’s leaders (Wang and Hsieh 2013), thus potentially affecting services delivered
to citizens (Vigoda-Gadot and Beeri 2011).
While employee silence may thus have substantial detrimental consequences for
public organizations, its relatively recent rise to prominence as a concept has meant
that research into its antecedents remains incipient (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero 2003;
Wang and Hsieh 2013; Jain 2015; Hassan 2015). Nevertheless, we know from previous
research in the management sciences and in organizational psychology that substantial
organizational changes can heighten perceptions of risk, uncertainty and fear of various
adverse consequences affecting an organization (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981;
Olsen and Sexton 2009; Muurlink et al. 2012) and that frequent changes may exacerbate
such effects (Rafferty and Griffin 2006; Pollitt 2007). Thus, in this paper we examine
whether the imposition of multiple successive structural reforms in public organizations
may cause defensive silence, a specific subtype of employee silence associated with fear of
adverse consequences for asserting one’s position (Pinder and Harlos 2001; Van Dyne,
Ang, and Botero 2003). In particular, we expect to find that uncertainty and threat
perceptions generated through such reforms heighten the propensity for individuals to
remain quiet to avoid potential adversity, disputes and controversy (e.g. Bommer and
Jalajas 1999; Vakola and Bouradas 2005). Moreover, when structural reforms are fre-
quently imposed, cues to remain quiet should become recurrent. This may be reflected in
heightened levels of defensive silence observed after sequences of reform, as well as
a gradual internalization of defensive silence as an appropriate and normal form of
behavior through social cues within the organization (Wang and Hsieh 2013; Hassan
2015; Kiewitz et al. 2016). These various processes should in turn manifest themselves in
the degree to which employees report issues and problems that may create some degree
of controversy among their superiors or peers.
While research on employee silence and on its sub-dimensions has gradually been
gaining prominence in the private sector management literature (e.g. Wang and Hsieh
2013; Jain 2015), the concept and its potential antecedents have as of yet received scant
attention in the field of public administration (although see Hassan (2015) and De Graaf
(2010)). However, processes particularly important to public organizations, including the
early detection of policy failures or the identification of areas of improvement in policy
implementation, are highly dependent on the input of civil servants that implement an
organization’s policies and tasks (Walumbwa and Schaubroeck 2009). Oftentimes such
policy failures and areas of improvement are simultaneously subjects controversial to
discuss within organizations, as suggestions and criticisms may run counter to the status
quo or decisions from higher echelons (De Graaf 2010).
One high profile and devastating example of such a silence-induced policy failure is
Space Shuttle Columbia’s disintegration during re-entry in 2003. Insulating foam struck
the Shuttle’s wing after takeoff, an issue long known to NASA engineers as potentially
dangerous to the Shuttle’s structural integrity (Farjoun, 2005, 14–15). However, as this
had not resulted in critical problems during earlier launches, management gradually
became convinced that these occurrences were a non-issue, while engineers became
reluctant to speak up against their superiors to avoid disputes. This led to a misplaced
sense of consensus at the management level that mission safety was ensured, a factor that
was ultimately an important enabler of the 2003 disaster (Moorhead, Ference and Neck
1991, 258).
In addition to policy failures, civil servants close to the execution of tasks may also
have ideas or information useful to the performance or change processes of an
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organization (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero 2003; Wang and Hsieh 2013; Hassan 2015;
Vakola and Bouradas 2005). The failure of an organization to utilize such grass-roots
ideas may hinder its adaptability to its immediate external environment. Thus, given the
importance of silence and voice in the public sector, and as empirical research on the side
effects of repeated (structural) reforms remains scant (Pollitt 2007), our contribution will
have important implications for policy-makers regarding ways that they may inadver-
tently influence organizations.
We test these expectations we use data on Norwegian state agencies, linking
responses to the 2006 and 2016 Norwegian staff surveys with the Norwegian State
Administration Database (NSAD), which includes information on structural
reforms that organizations have been subjected to. In this context, structural
reforms are defined as change events that alter organizational boundaries in
terms of units included (e.g. mergers/splits or the absorption/secession of orga-
nizational units), that alter tasks attributed to organizations (including the alloca-
tion of new tasks or the loss of existing tasks) and/or that alter the structural
embeddedness of organizations in the broader public sector (i.e. their legal forms
and ministerial portfolios in which they are positioned) (see e.g. MacCarthaigh
and Roness 2012).
The Norwegian public sector offers an interesting setting for our investigation into
the effects of sequences of structural reforms. Despite being a reluctant reformer in
the 1980s and 1990s, recent decades have seen not only NPM reforms but also New
Public Governance and Neo-Weberian reforms. The most significant recent reform
waves in Norway include hospital reforms (2001), welfare administration reforms
(2007) and police reforms (2015). In contrast to those of many other European
countries, the Norwegian reform trajectory has been relatively successful (Greve,
Lægreid, and Rykkja 2016). The presence of such reforms implies that various
Norwegian public organizations have undergone frequent structural reforms over
the past decade, rendering this country a suitable case for studying the effects of
sequences of structural reforms.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Defensive silence
While concepts such as voice have received considerable attention in recent decades,
research on employee silence and its antecedents remains at a relatively early stage. In
part, this is due to the previously held (often tacit) assumption that employees who
remain silent agree with the policies, decisions and behaviors of their peers and superiors
(Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero 2003). In the 1990s and early 2000s, however, researchers
began to recognize that silence in organizations is often engaged in as a conscious choice.
Pinder and Harlos (2001) recognized the concept’s multidimensional nature and pro-
posed a distinction between acquiescent silence (i.e. silence based on a belief that speak-
ing up on a certain issue will not make a difference) and quiescent silence (i.e. silence
based on a fear of the detrimental consequences of speaking up), the latter being the focus
of this contribution. Although later typologies have often renamed quiescent silence as
defensive silence, and have added a number of other dimensions,1 the basic distinction
introduced by Pinder and Harlos (2001) has remained prominent throughout the
literature (e.g. Morrison 2011; Wang and Hsieh 2013).
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In their seminal contribution Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero (2003) emphasize that
defensive silence represents a proactive behavior on the part of employees. This
distinguishes defensive silence from acquiescent silence, a behavior based on the
resignation that an event is unchangeable, that speaking up will be futile and an
unwillingness to exert effort to voice issues. Thus, acquiescent silence may be seen as
a mixture of resignation and disengagement, related to neglect and inaction behaviors
(Van Dyne, Ang and Botero 2003). When engaging in defensive silence, on the other
hand, an individual determines that speaking up is in some way risky to his/her
position as doing so may cause disputes, controversies and/or sanctioning, and that
this risk outweighs the benefits of speaking up (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero 2003, see
also De Graaf 2010). The key difference between acquiescent and defensive silence
thus lies in its antecedent motivation: while the former is based on resignation,
lacking self-efficacy and/or a lack of engagement, the latter is based on the perception
of risk associated with speaking up. Defensive silence notably may cause individuals
to put aside suggestions, proposals, ideas and issues that they may have while
preferring not to take action to avoid being viewed as a ‘troublemaker’ (Vakola and
Bouradas 2005; Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin 2003; De Graaf 2010).
Such fear is likely caused by a variety of factors. Not only can a message itself be
controversial or potentially damaging, an employee’s relationship with his/her super-
visors and risks of being sanctioned are also likely determinants of an individual’s
inclination towards a defensive silence strategy (Vakola and Bouradas 2005; Wang
and Hsieh 2013; Bommer and Jalajas 1999; Rhee, Dedahanov, and Lee 2014). Power
asymmetries and perceptions thereof play an important role in this regard, as
individuals with less power require the resources and support of their superiors,
ensuring that the former will be sensitive to the latter’s signals (Kiewitz et al. 2016).
However, this is not to say that defensive silence only manifests itself in relationships
between supervisors and subordinates. Risks are inherent in exchanges with other
colleagues as well, and defensive silence may serve to avoid disapproval from peers or
to prevent a controversial issue from being disseminated throughout the workplace.
Moreover, in the public sector, silence is likely present in external communication as
well, as fear of stakeholder reprisals, public scrutiny and political disapproval loom
when communicating on controversial actions.
Moreover, the broader organizational environment, encompassing aspects such as
the degree to which participation and proactive behaviors are encouraged, as well as the
degree to which individuals generally feel safe to speak up are likely to contribute to
overall levels of defensive silence in an organization (Premeaux and Bedeian 2003;
Walumbwa and Schaubroeck 2009; Wang and Hsieh 2013). This is reinforced by the
social cues within an organization, which inform individuals as to whether speaking up
on a certain topic at a certain time is appropriate (Wang and Hsieh 2013; Hassan 2015;
Kiewitz et al. 2016). These cues and environments may themselves be embedded in
longer-term organizational cultures, in which norms such as following instructions
from superiors are passed on from employee to employee (Damanpour 1991). This
may even affect new entrants, as they quickly learn the nuances of the organization’s
culture through socialization processes, including which types of behaviors are deemed
(un)acceptable (Kim, Cable, and Kim 2005). Finally, occurrences external to an orga-
nization may reduce the degree to which input is accepted, as external crises may for
instance foster a sense of short-term urgency within an organization (Vakola and
Bouradas 2005; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). This implies that factors
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influencing aspects such as power asymmetries, working environments, extant cultures
and perceptions of urgency within an organization may be conducive to the strategic
use of defensive silence by employees.
2.2 The theoretical link between structural reforms and defensive silence
Structural reforms have been found to have a large variety of intended and unin-
tended effects on organizations, with many of the latter being related to perceptions
of uncertainty that they produce (Bommer and Jalajas 1999; Amiot et al. 2006; Pollitt
2007; Moore, Grunberg, and Greenberg 2004; Rafferty and Griffin 2006). Frequent
changes in the makeup of an organization are accompanied by uncertainty regarding
future structures, with employees wondering whether and how any changes will affect
them and their position within an organization (Rafferty and Restubog 2017). As the
rate of public sector restructuring increases to the point that some organizations
experience it as continuous (MacCarthaigh 2012; Pollitt 2007), perceptions of uncer-
tainty may become exacerbated due to a lack of a determinate end to the structural
reform process (Rafferty and Griffin 2006; Rafferty and Restubog 2017). In this
context, it is important to emphasize that such uncertainty affects every echelon of
an organization affected by a structural reform, with managers facing the uncertainty
and urgency of implementing aspects of structural reforms falling under their remit
while other members of an organization face consequences that are (partially) beyond
their control.
We argue that, through such uncertainty, various effects are caused within the
organization that increase the degree to which individuals engage in defensive
silence. To understand why uncertainty resulting from frequent structural reforms
may cause defensive silence it is helpful to briefly elaborate on threat-rigidity
theory, which was developed in organizational psychology to predict effects that
an organization experiences when facing a potentially threatening situation
(Amabile and Conti 1999; Olsen and Sexton 2009). In defining a threat as ‘an
environmental event that has impending negative or harmful consequences for the
entity,’ Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981, 502) argue that threatening events may
have a number of effects on various levels of an organization. First, events perceived
as threatening are likely to increase levels of stress and anxiety throughout the
organization (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; D’Aunno and Sutton 1992; Olsen
and Sexton 2009; Muurlink et al. 2012). This occurs not only for top managers
tasked with guiding an organization through a threat (Muurlink et al. 2012) but also
at lower levels of an organization, as individuals fear that their own positions, their
future prospects or the organization’s well-being may be adversely affected by
a given threat (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
Second, threatening events generate perceptions of urgency and especially for
decision-makers within organizations, who feel that they must avert or mitigate
threats as soon as possible (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; Muurlink et al.
2012). Together, these effects have a variety of implications for the behaviors of
individuals within organizations. At this level, some frequently observed conse-
quences of the threat-rigidity effect include a centralization of control and
a formalization of procedures by an organization’s management team (D’Aunno
and Sutton 1992), which exacerbate power asymmetries within an organization and
which induce social cues against speaking up. Uncertainty resulting from structural
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reforms cause decision-makers to centralize control in small groups to be able to
quickly and decisively address a threatening event inter alia by reducing the degree
to which disputes and conflicts must be considered within an urgent context (Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; D’Aunno and Sutton 1992; Olsen and Sexton 2009).
Simultaneously, a less flexible, more formalistic mode of internal governance is
adopted to ensure conformity during the threatening period (Olsen and Sexton
2009). The combination of uncertainty and urgency is also likely to cause the
organization’s decision-makers to experience information overload (Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton 1981), leading decision-makers to overemphasize solutions
and knowledge applied in the past (Muurlink et al. 2012; Daly et al. 2011). In this
context, an increased focus on ‘in-group’ decision-making during the threatening
event serves to simplify information and problems confronting the organization
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). However, this in-group decision-making
combined with the aforementioned tendency to centralize control may simulta-
neously lead to groupthink and an intolerance for deviant opinions.
Third, employees in lower levels of an organization, similarly faced with
a threatening stressor, will tend toward uncertainty-reducing behavior. Thus, to
manage the uncertainty confronting them, employees may become more sensitive
to cues from superiors and to their work environment, while becoming less inclined
to take independent action (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; Bommer and Jalajas
1999). This is reflected in existing research with authors finding a reduced propensity
for creative behavior and involvement (Olsen and Sexton 2009; Amabile and Conti
1999) and a reduced willingness to take risks or make suggestions to supervisors
(Bommer and Jalajas 1999). This uncertainty-reducing tendency is compounded by
processes occurring at higher levels in the organization, with the aforementioned
increases in formalization and centralization increasing power asymmetries and the
likelihood of hostile responses towards deviant behavior (Olsen and Sexton 2009). In
sum, through threat-rigidity effects, organizations may be expected to become less
accepting of deviant opinions and suggestions while individuals may simultaneously
become less inclined to engage in behavior that could lead to conflict and controversy
and that could thus place their own positions at risk.
As elaborated on earlier in this section, defensive silence is motivated by perceptions
of threat and fear regarding potentially adverse consequences of speaking up (Premeaux
and Bedeian 2003). Various elements of threat-rigidity theory may therefore foster an
environment conducive to the use of defensive silence. Increases in uncertainty and
threats to individual positions (e.g. job security, maintaining current job content or the
continuation of valued projects) may directly heighten the degree to which individuals
are likely to use strategies to avoid being viewed as a ‘troublemaker,’ including those of
defensive silence (Vakola and Bouradas 2005). Moreover, as organizations under threat
often increase levels of formalization and sanctioning when experiencing threatening
events, the fear of being labelled a troublemaker upon speaking up may be heightened
further (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
Wang and Hsieh (2013) moreover report a negative effect on defensive silence
when individuals experience their organization’s environment to be caring, nurturing
and ethical, and when they perceive high levels of organizational support. Similarly,
Walumbwa and Schaubroeck (2009) find reduced levels of silence when employees
experience a psychologically secure environment while Vakola and Bouradas (2005)
find that whether or not supervisors deny employees the opportunity to express
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themselves is a powerful predictor of the occurrence of defensive silence. Therefore,
the effects predicted by threat-rigidity theory, including reduced participation in
decision-making, increases in groupthink and an increased intolerance of deviant
opinions, may reduce the degree to which employees consider their environments
supportive and safe to speak up in and encouraging the use of defensive silence.
Finally, as employees are part of a broader social context involving a sequence of
structural reforms, this effect may be further ingrained due to social cues emphasiz-
ing perceptions of threat, fear and silence (Hassan 2015).
Moreover, there are some important indications that the effects of structural
reforms, including those predicted by threat-rigidity theory, may be dynamic
over time – increasing when reforms confront an organization sequentially and
gradually decreasing as an organization enters calmer waters (e.g. Seo and Hill
2005). Rafferty and Griffin (2006) and Rafferty and Restubog (2017) argue that
repeated or continuous changes may further heighten levels of uncertainty and
stress, as individuals see no discernible end to the structural reform trajectory.
Moore, Grunberg, and Greenberg (2004) and Grunberg et al. (2008) accordingly
find that work-related stress is exacerbated for respondents who have experi-
enced multiple reforms. Following threat-rigidity, we may expect to find further
reductions in participation and information-processing and further increases in
centralization, groupthink, formalization and sanctioning in such repeatedly
reformed organizations. As these factors may in turn be conducive to defensive
silence, it is likely that frequent and continuous structural reforms may increase
levels of defensive silence in an organization beyond what we might expect to
observe in organizations that have only experienced a single reform event.
Moreover, when defensive silence is heightened for a prolonged period of time
in a continuously reformed organizations, we may begin to expect a gradual
effect on the organization’s culture, causing it to become gradually less con-
ducive to speaking up without consequences (Wynen, Verhoest, and Kleizen
2017). We therefore propose, first, that structural reforms may increase the
usage of defensive silence on an individual level through effects predicted by
threat-rigidity theory and, second, that multiple successive structural reforms
occurring to an organization may further increase the propensity of organization
employees to engage in defensive silence.
3. Data
To empirically test the relationship between an organization’s history of structural
reforms and degrees of defensive silence observed among employees working in these
organizations, we make use of two data sources on Norwegian state agencies.
First, we use data from a comprehensive web-based survey conducted every 10 years on
civil servants of the different directorates and of other central administration organizations
functioning apart from the ministries in Norway. The survey is conducted as part of
a Central Administration study, its technical execution is managed by the Norwegian
Social Science Data Service (NSD) and its setup and funding is managed through
a collaborative arrangement between the University of Bergen, the University of Oslo
and the University of Agder. The survey includes information on individual demographic
measures, on structural variables, on attitudes and on a range of other issues. Our analyses
focus on employees of central state agencies and are based on the most recent 2016 and
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2006 surveys, which are a continuation of corresponding surveys conducted in 1976, 1986
and 1996. The state agencies included in our sample have the following Norwegian-specific
form of affiliation: ‘directorates, central agencies and other ordinary agencies outside the
ministries which are the types most closely linked to the state centre and subject to general
government regulatory frameworks’ (Lægreid, Roness, and Rubecksen 2012, 235). They are
clearly Type 1 agencies as defined by Van Thiel (2012, 20) as semi-autonomous organiza-
tions without legal independence but with somemanagerial autonomy.We utilize the 2016
and 2006 waves of the survey as they offer the closest resemblance in terms of utilized
questions. The 2006 staff survey has a response rate of 59.3%, accounting for 1452
respondents of 49 central agencies. The 2016 survey is based on 1963 respondents of 47
central agencies with a response rate of 59.5%. More precise information on the survey
process, on response rates of each organization and on the validity of responses can be
found at the NSD website (http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/en/civilservice/). Item non-
response reduced the total sample of both surveys to a usable dataset of 1077 employees
within 41 central state agencies (with at least 5 respondents per organization). We
compared the sample used with the original representative sample for the average respon-
dent age and gender. Both samples are similar, suggesting that observations used to
estimate the regressions constitute a representative subsample of all employees originally
included in the survey. Moreover, we calculated a Representativity-indicator (R-indicator
or M()) (see for a detailed discussion Schouten et al. 2012). Such an indicator is based on
the standard deviation of estimated probabilities and is defined by:
M ρð Þ¼ 1 2S ρð Þ (1)
The probability for being in the smaller subsample or not is estimated by applying
a logisitic regression model using the variables age, gender, tenure, position, task and
starting job as auxiliary variables. The smaller subsample is not representative if there
is much variation in response probabilities. This is reflected by a large standard error.
The maximum value the standard error can assume is 0.5. In this case the value of the
R-indicator is equal to 0. For our subsample the value of the R-indicator (M()) is
equal to 0.95, indicating that respondents in the subsample do not differ significantly
from respondents in the original and representative sample.
Second, as an indicator for the structural reforms that organizations have experienced
through their lifetime was constructed from data of the Norwegian State Administration
Database (NSAD; http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/en/civilservice/). For these 41 organiza-
tions, the NSAD lists all reforms made to formal organizational structures from the
founding of the organizations to 2016. The database uses a predefined categorization that
classifies structural reforms into three main categories: reforms related to the founding of
an organization, reforms related to the survival or maintenance of an organization, and
reforms related to the termination of an organization. We are primarily interested in the
effects of structural reforms imposed during the lifetimes of organizations. Thus, we
focus on maintenance events such as those involving absorption and secession while
leaving birth and death events beyond consideration. In what follows structural reforms
leading to the creation or ending of public organizations are not included in our analysis.
A total of 156 maintenance events are recorded with the following distribution2:
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3.1. Operationalizing defensive silence
As discussed by Pinder and Harlos (2001), defensive silence is an intentional and proactive
behavior based on a fear of the consequences of speaking up (see also Van Dyne, Ang, and
Botero 2003; Milliken et al., 2005). As such it involves a conscious decision to withhold
ideas, information, and opinions as the best personal strategy (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero
2003) to avoid conflict, disputes or controversy. To measure defensive silence, a two-item
scale is used in line with the concept of defensive silence of Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero
(2003). Both questions gauge the extent to which an individual has refrained to commu-
nicate or interact on a topic from a fear of spurring conflicts, disputes or controversy and
utilize a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very often) to 5 (never):
– Have you, during the past year, failed to raise a problem/matter within your area
because you assumed that there would be a dispute about it?
– Have you, during the past year, put aside program proposals, draft laws, regula-
tions, etc. within your area because there was controversy about these?
Answers given to these questions generated a single factor (based on a polychoric
matrix) and a Cronbach’s α for this index of .74. The factor score is used as the
dependent variable.3 The lower the score, the higher the degree of defensive silence.
3.2. An organization’s history of structural reforms
From information collected from the NSAD it was possible to construct an indicator for
the history of structural reforms of each organization. This history was reconstructed
from the date of each organization’s founding to the time of each staff survey. It is
difficult to make definitive statements on the length of time any single structural reform
will impact the organization, in particular as a reform may interact with other structural
reforms being implemented slightly earlier or later. Thus, to examine whether our
analyses remain robust under slightly differing assumptions on the duration of the effect
of structural reforms, our dependent ‘history of structural reforms’ was calculated in
three ways; X
Reform eventsð Þ (1)
The first operationalization consists of the total number of structural reforms that
each organization has experienced over its lifetime.
X Year of reform event  Birthdate
Age of the organization
 
(2)
In the second operationalization, history is dependent on the date when reforms
occurred, with a longer time period yielding a lower impact factor.
X 1
2016 Yearof reformð Þ
 
(3)
The third operationalization takes the time dimension into account, yet unlike (2),
it deviates from a linear depreciation by allowing for an exponential decline. It is,
however, important to note that for reforms occurring in 2016, the denominator is
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set to 1. Hence reforms occurring in 2015 (year before the survey) and 2016 (year of
the survey) have an equal effect. Moreover, in coding 3 it is clear that recent reforms
have a significantly larger impact than ‘older’ ones.
Although little systematic research has been conducted, there are some articles that
point to coding 3 as the most realistic operationalization. Allen et al. (2001), investigat-
ing a downsizing event, notes significant and sizeable effects on job security percep-
tions, role overload, organizational commitment and turnover intent immediately
following a reform, and a resurgence in the same variables one year and four months
following the reform (and without another reform being introduced). Despite moving
towards pre-reform levels, most variables remained somewhat suppressed after a year
had passed. In one of the rare studies tracking multiple reforms, Grunberg et al. (2008)
and Moore, Grunberg, and Greenberg (2004) observe an accumulation of effects while
the organization continues to encounter change, but Grunberg et al. (2008) also find
a partial recovery one year after the studied organization enters more stable waters.
Moreover, while recovery did set in relatively soon in the study by Grunberg et al.
(2008), most well-being variables remain somewhat suppressed. Combined, these
results suggest that the strongest effects manifest during the early phases of the reform,
but that many effects may linger much longer. These results are similar to what is
expected in the theoretical model proposed by Seo and Hill (2005), who suggest that
uncertainty, conflict, job environment change and acculturation stress should be stron-
gest in the initial planning and operational implementation phases of a structural
reform, after which a stabilization period follows in which many effects still linger at
reduced levels. Furthermore, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, papers such as
those by Grunberg et al. (2008) and Moore, Grunberg, and Greenberg (2004) also
indicate that effects may accumulate when recovery remains incomplete. Thus, a coding
that 1) captures strong effects immediately following a structural reform, 2) that also
allows for some (but a substantially reduced) effect of that reform in later times, and 3)
allows this effect to accumulate with the effect of other structural reforms, seems the
most well-supported interpretation of the long-term effects of a sequence of structural
reforms.
As discussed above, we were forced to use a subsample of the initial data. To
ensure that this did not introduce a bias in terms of organizational history, we
compared the histories of the initial organizations with those of the organizations
included in our sample. Averages for the different operationalizations of organiza-
tional history for both the original (including organizations removed from the
analysis) and the used sample of organizations are presented in Table 1. Although
values for the used sample are slightly higher than those of the original sample, the
differences are not significant.
Table 1. Comparison of histories of the original and used sample.
Original Sample Used Sample
2006 2016 2006 2016 Independent Samples T
Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 2006 20
History (1) 2,21 2,77 3,04 2,90 2,40 2,88 3,29 3,03 t=-1.55 p=.12 t=-.02
History (2) 1,35 1,87 2,37 2,34 1,43 1,94 2,58 2,47 t=-.73 p=.46 t=-0.48
History (3) 0,19 0,41 0,08 0,21 0,21 0,45 0,09 0,23 t=.59 p=.55 t=1.12
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3.3. Control variables
Based on the literature on employee silence we consider a wide range of variables of the
individual and organizational levels that control for alternative explanations for the
occurrence of defensive silence. The first set reflects individual characteristics. The
following variables are used: 1) age, 2) gender, 3) current position, 4) tenure within
the organization, 5) the position of the respondent upon entering the organization, 6)
language, 7) whether the respondent has studied abroad, 8) the respondent’s current
responsibilities, 9) whether the respondent has received any job offers over the past year,
and 10) whether a respondent is politically engaged. In addition to these individual
characteristics, we also include the individual’s perception on his/her job and the
organization. Variables on these factors include 1) the degree to which there are clear
rules concerning an individual’s job, 2) attitudes towards superiors, 3) the importance of
loyalty, 4) professional behavior and 5) the propensity to follow rules. Respondents were
asked to assign a weight based on the importance of these elements while carrying out
their work. Apart from these individual-level controls we consider information on the
primary task of each organization (based on the Classification of the Functions of
Government, see Table A2) and on organizational age. Table 2 shows descriptive
statistics while a correlation matrix for key variables is provided in Table 3. The precise
wording of the survey questions as well as a full correlation matrix and an overview of
the variance inflation factors is available in appendix.
4. Method & results
As our observations of defensive silence are simultaneously nested within organizations
and years (we rely on 2006 and 2016 waves of the staff survey), a linear multilevel
analysis4 with crossed random effects was employed. More precisely, we believe the effect
of survey year to be systematic to that year and common to all employees. Our rationale is
that we assume that survey year-specific random factors, such as overall economic and
political conditions, have significant systematic effects on the defensive silence behaviors
of all employees. As such, we model a two-way crossed-effects model with organization
effects crossed with survey-year effects. Corresponding results are presented in Table 3.
Entries included in the table are the full maximum likelihood estimates.
We first estimated an ‘empty’ (also called ‘unconditional’ or ‘null’) model to
determine the extent of variance between organizations (Column (1)). When aver-
aging across respondents, organizations and years, the indicator for defensive silence
equals 3.9. This corresponds well with the mean for defensive silence (see Table 2).
Moreover, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test value equals 44.30 with 2 degrees of free-
dom and with a p-value of .000, which must be halved to obtain a less conservative
test.5 In this case, halving does not affect the conclusion. The null hypothesis should
be rejected, as there is evidence of cross-organization and cross-survey year variation
in levels of defensive silence.
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) estimates the proportion of variance at
the organization and year levels relative to the overall variance. As the dependent variable
is measured at the individual level (civil servant level), this level should also present the
highest ICC score (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 231). The ICC equals roughly 7%,
meaning that roughly 7% of the variance in defensive silence is attributable to differences
observed across organizations and across both survey years, with the remaining
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93 percent being attributable to individual differences. Even though the ICC is not very
high, disregarding it would lead to erroneous conclusions, both statistically and
empirically.
In the subsequent step (see column (2)), the level-1 covariates have been added
to the model, for now assuming fixed effects. The intercept was, however, allowed
to vary across organizations and survey years to accommodate cross-organization
and year differences in baseline self-censorship. In this column it is noticeable
that age, the degree to which clear rules are given concerning a respondent’s job,
respondent tasks, the importance of professional considerations and the political
engagement of the respondents significantly affect levels of defensive silence.





Defensive silence Factore Score 3.870 0.758
Failed to propose an issue 46 40 4.283 0.943
Failed to raise an issue 47 47_1 4.268 0.928
Organizational level N = 41 (across 2 years)
Individuals per organizations Min. 6
Average 26,3
Max. 78
Number of events 2.877 2.853




Individual level N = 1077
Age 9 531 3.807 1.062
Gender 10 54 1.434 0.496
Position 2 2I 1.750 1.071
Tenure 2B 6I_3 2.669 0.569
Startingjob 5 5I 2.004 1.073
Rules 17 7 2.829 1.159
Task 15 5 6.003 2.474
Joboffers 8A 52A 1.655 0.476
Study abroad 13 56 1.805 0.396
Language 54 57 1.929 0.374
Important_loyality 18B 18B 1.666 0.837
Important_Professional 18F 18F 1.378 0.601
Important_Law 18J 18J 1.499 0.852
Political 59 62 0.291 0.454
Attitude to superior 49 43 1.500 0.615
Year 2010 4.942
aThe surveys can be consulted on line:
http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/StatiskeDokument/SpSkjemaDir06.html
Table 3. Correlation matrix between key independent and dependent variables.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Failed to propose an issue (1) 1.0000
Failed to raise an issue (2) 0.6011* 1.0000
Number of events (3) −0.0203 0.0016 1.0000
Linear depreciation (4) −0.0239 0.0039 0.8802* 1.0000
Exponential depreciation (5) −0.0026 −0.0664 0.2010 0.1845* 1.0000
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Again there is evidence of variation in the intercepts. Comparing the fit of the
random intercept model to that of a regression model yields an LR score of 40.55
with a p-value of .000. Hence, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis that the
intercept is the same across all organizations and survey years, as the regression
model assumes. Moreover, these level-1 covariates account for roughly 16 percent
of the variation in the outcome.
Table 4. Multilevel results with crossed effects.
Index Defensive Silence
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 3.90*** 3.72*** 3.71*** 3.71*** 3.71***
(0.05) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Individual level
Age 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Position χ2 (3)=1.37 χ2 (3)=1.01 χ2 (3)=0.92 χ2 (3)=1.05
Tenure χ2 (2)=0.82 χ2 (2)=1.4 χ2 (2)=1.29 χ2 (2)=1.42
Startingjob χ2 (4)=4.57 χ2 (4)=3.85 χ2 (4)=3.83 χ2 (4)=4.15
Rules -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Task χ2 (9)=18.32** χ2 (9)=19.2** χ2 (9)=19.16** χ2 (9)=20.22**
Joboffers 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Attitude to superior 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Studiedabroad 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Language χ2 (3)=4.65 χ2 (3)=5.33 χ2 (3)=5.18 χ2 (3)=4.99
Importance_loyality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Importance_Professional -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Importance_Law 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Political -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
Organizational level
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)













Observations 1.077 1.077 1.077 1.077 1.077
Number of Organizations 41 41 41 41 41
Number of Years 2 2 2 2 2







Level-2 R² 0.683 0.631 0.597
St andard errors in parent heses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1.
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To account for variation in the intercepts, we add level 2 covariates to columns 3, 4
and 5. The difference between these 3 columns lies in the coding of organizational
histories. Column 3 includes the first operationalization of organizational history (total
number of structural reforms an organization has endured over its lifetime), column 4
includes the second operationalization of organizational history (taking the time dimen-
sion into account via linear depreciation) and column 5 is based on the third operatio-
nalization of history (taking the time dimension into account via exponential
depreciation). For all models, the same level-1 covariates remain statistically significant.
Of the newly added level-2 covariates, the function of the organization and of all codings
of organizational history are statistically significant. We find that a higher score for
organizational history significantly affects levels of defensive silence engaged in by
employees. Thus, the more organizations are faced with structural reforms, the more
their employees are likely to engage in defensive silence (reversed coding). Following
from column 3 it appears that an increase of one structural reform leads to a 4% increase
in this form of behavior. This is visualized in Figure 2.
A similar observation can be made for column 4 (linear depreciation). Yet the
effect of structural reforms increases significantly when allowing for exponential
depreciation. From this operationalization it appears that a new structural reform
occurring in the following year (an additional event occurring in 2017 will increase
the value of organizational history by a value of 1) will spur a temporal increase in
levels of defensive silence engaged in by employees in a given organization of
roughly 20%.
Moreover, while the effect of a new reform event will decline over time, it will
boost the overall index of organizational history. As such, we argue that organizations
may experience effects of any given structural reform over the long-term, even if their
impact is gradually reduced over the years, and that these effects may accumulate
when multiple reforms occur in quick succession. The level-2 R2 values range from
68% to 60%, suggesting that the level-2 variables account for a significant proportion
of the variation in the intercepts. Hence, sequences of structural reforms appear to
significantly increase levels of defensive silence.
To check the robustness of our results, we removed structural reforms involving
a ‘change of name’ from the list of structural reforms. Although this type of event can
be argued to represent a discontinuation of ‘key structural features’ (Hajnal 2012, 837;
Greasley and Hanretty 2014), the inclusion of this type of change can also be
criticized on grounds that it has little or no impact on the functioning of an
organization (for a detailed discussion, see Kuipers, Yesilkagit, and Carroll 2018).
Following this reasoning, a name change should not contribute to the turmoil caused
by a sequence of other structural reforms or should have only a minor effect.
Therefore, our analyses were also tested across the maintenance events discussed in
Figure 1 but while excluding events involving a name change. Corresponding results
are presented in Table A1 (Appendix). The exclusion of this type of event has no
impact on our findings; sequences of structural reforms increase employee engage-
ment in defensive silence within an organization.
5. Discussion
The results presented in the previous section offer substantial support for our expectation
that sequences of structural reforms increase the likelihood for public sector employees
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to engage in defensive silence options. Importantly, our results imply that the effects of
structural reforms on defensive silence are determined not only by discrete structural
reform events, but also by their accumulation and interplay over time (Rafferty and
Griffin 2006). It seems that these effects persist long after their imposition, either through
lingering adaptation efforts or through their effects on the cognitive processes of employ-
ees (Allen et al. 2001; Rafferty and Restubog 2017).
Our observation that employees become hesitant to speak up in frequently
reformed organizations due to a fear of adverse consequences lends further credit
to the arguments of threat-rigidity theory that structural reforms induce
a constricting effect within organizations. In turn, this constricting effect causes
individual employees to perceive voice options on controversial issues as riskful,
reducing the likelihood of such options being utilized (Bommer and Jalajas 1999).
Moreover, from our observations we are able to make a number of propositions on
the temporal dynamics that influence the defensive silence, and the mechanisms
through which threat-rigidity in turn influences the degree of defensive silence in
the organization. It has been argued that structural reforms heighten an employee’s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
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New superior organization and level
Maintenance by absorption























Figure 1. Available maintenance events and their distributions.
Figure 2. Plot of the coefficient of organizational history (number of events).
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perceptions of risk associated with any given initiative due to perceptions of
uncertainty or threat (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; Bommer and Jalajas
1999). As turmoil becomes a constant factor within repeatedly reformed organiza-
tions, employees may perceive the process as having no predictable path or dis-
cernable end, further increasing their perceptions of uncertainty regarding both the
change process and their positions within the organization (Rafferty and Griffin
2006). We argue that this process may in turn enhance perceptions of threat,
discouraging employees from speaking up on controversial and sensitive issues.
Threat-rigidity theory furthermore suggests that structural reforms render man-
agers and decision-makers more likely to operate in a top-down and formalized
manner (Amabile and Conti 1999), increasing fear of reprisal or of other adverse
consequences for the display of deviant behaviors or opinions. The combination of
both mechanisms gradually creates an atmosphere in which defensive silence is
engaged in more frequently. Over the long-term, and as further structural reforms
continue to confront an organization, levels of defensive silence may remain
heightened and can gradually become ingrained within an organization through
social cues and organizational cultures (Hassan 2015).
It is also interesting that we observe this relationship within the context of the
Norwegian public sector. As noted above, the threat-rigidity effect operates in part
through power asymmetries, formalization and a decreased tolerance for deviant
opinions. Simultaneously, Norwegian culture is characterized as comparatively coop-
erative, low in power distance levels and relatively tolerant of uncertainty; factors
which are conducive to flat organizations and to the acceptance of deviant opinions
(Hofstede 1980; Hetland and Sandal 2003). Thus, if national cultures would mediate
or moderate the relationship between structural reforms and defensive silence, it is
arguable that Norway would be a comparatively unlikely candidate to display the
effects explored in this article. Indeed, Jain (2015) argues that employees working in
countries characterized instead by high levels of power asymmetry and a strong sense
of hierarchy should be relatively prone to engaging in various forms of silence. Given
that we consistently find a relationship between sequences of structural reform and
defensive silence even in the Norwegian context, we are cautiously optimistic that the
results presented here are generalizable to other national contexts.
Our observation that long-term sequences of structural reforms have cumulative
effects runs counter to a current tendency for the academic literature and policy-
making circles to view (structural) reforms as isolated events (Moore, Grunberg, and
Greenberg 2004) and suggests that a more holistic view of the long-term processes
operating within organizations is needed (Pollitt 2007). Our results imply that policy-
makers should actively attempt to consider lingering effects of previous reformmoments
in their analyses of the costs and benefits that future structural reforms may have.
Furthermore, our finding that previous structural reforms have left a legacy with regard
to defensive silence behaviors can encourage the exploration of improved change
management during the implementation of future structural reforms, as organizations
can attempt to implement programs intended to foster the perception that employees
may safely voice their concerns and suggestions (Walumbwa and Schaubroeck 2009).
This may include additional communication and support frommanagers to enhance the
perception that discussing problems and controversial topics is encouraged and empha-
sizing that no sanctions will be taken against employees that speak up on sensitive issues
(e.g. Borins 2001; Axtell et al. 2000; Premeaux and Bedeian 2003; Rhee, Dedahanov, and
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Lee 2014). In particular in cases where remaining silent could have strong detrimental
consequences, this may include various procedures to safely or anonymously report
issues, including the introduction of Ombudsmen and appropriate whistleblowing
channels and safeguards. Procedures could include rules guaranteeing unequivocal
protection of whistleblowers and effective follow-up of such rules through disciplinary
action (Lewis 2002). Management could furthermore attempt to increase the awareness
of reporting, mediation and whistleblowing procedures within their organizations, to
ensure that employees are aware of existing options to safely voice serious concerns
(Chiu 2003).
Regarding control variables, we find interesting results for rule clarity, the
importance of professional behavior and political engagement, all of which sig-
nificantly increase the probability of a respondent having engaged in defensive
silence behavior. The effect for rule clarity likely represents a general increase of
wariness concerning the consequences of speaking up in more heavily regulated
environments. This is consistent with results in innovation research, which find
that organizational cultures that overemphasize rule-following behavior are less
beneficial to creativity and new ideas (e.g. Damanpour 1991). Our results for
importance of professional behavior suggest that the degree to which behavioral
norms are embedded in an organization’s culture influences the perceived accept-
ability of speaking up. We speculate that increased institutionalization of certain
roles could reduce the acceptability for employees to openly deviate from behavior
expected in that role. Our result for political engagement is more puzzling,
however. One could speculate that politically active employees fear being seen as
politically biased, causing them to exhibit higher degrees of defensive silence
behavior. However, examining this in detail is beyond the scope of our analysis,
as more fine-grained measures of political engagement are necessary to address
this issue.
While our analysis includes several methodological improvements over previous
studies in the field (notably the measurement of multiple structural reforms and
the use of multilevel data and methods), this paper remains subject to several
limitations. While we account for long-term developments in our measurements of
structural reform history and defensive silence, the available data could not be
used to compile panel data. Hence, the presence of reverse causation or simulta-
neity could not be ruled out. Thus, future studies should use panel data estimators
to offer more definitive evidence on the causal direction between structural reform
histories and defensive silence. Utilizing such panel data estimators should simul-
taneously mitigate issues of endogeneity beyond what was possible from our data.
Moreover, given that threat-rigidity was used as a theoretical mechanism in the
current study, future studies should attempt to apply data on the various effects
proposed by the theory.
6. Conclusion
This paper set out to investigate how multiple reforms implemented over time
produce a cumulative effect on the use of defensive silence strategies by employees.
For a sample of 1077 civil servants employed at 41 Norwegian central agencies it was
found that the use of defensive silence as a strategy to avoid conflicts increases
following repeated structural reform. The insight that structural reforms are not
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independent interventions, but instead form an integral part of a broader organiza-
tional history, will hopefully inspire further research on the long-term processes that
affect an organization’s functioning and performance. Future research should for
instance focus on the effects of multiple structural reforms on other outcomes, such
as employee well-being, performance and organizational culture. Additionally, qua-
litative research on the workings of the threat-rigidity effect at various levels of an
organization seems necessary to tease out the specifics of this mechanism. Third,
additional research on the workings and antecedents of defensive silence for public
organizations seems necessary, as this factor may be an important determinant of an
organization’s capacity to avoid policy failure through feedback loops. Finally, other
forms of self-censoring behavior such as acquiescent silence (i.e. a tendency to self-
censor due to perceptions that one’s opinions are inconsequential) form areas
warranting further exploration. For practitioners and policymakers, the results pre-
sented here should serve as a warning that their plans for structural reform may be
influenced to a considerable degree by earlier reforms and that imposing new reforms
may have broader and more persistent detrimental effects than is often anticipated.
Indeed, when organizations seek to encourage openness and feedback, it seems that
the frequent and rapid introduction of structural reforms can become too much of
a good thing.
Notes
1. In addition to defensive and acquiescent silence, Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero (2003) identify
prosocial silence, a positive form of silence designed to defend peers or an organization.
2. The complete list of structural changes (starting, maintenance and ending events) included in
the NSAD can be consulted in the appendix (Table A1).
3. Based on the polychoric matrix, we calculated the weights (factor loadings). By doing so, the
factor score will not center on zero nor will it have a standard deviation of 1. To ensure that this
did not introduce a bias we re-ran the analyses whereby the dependent is a factor score based
on a factor analysis without first computing a polychoric matrix (i.e. based on the variables
directly). Results were identical.
4. To test whether the errors of the dependent are distributed normally, polynomials (quadratic,
cubic) of the fitted values were added as additional regressors. A Wald test was performed to
check if these polynomials jointly carried significant explanatory power. The test statistic (chi2
(2) distributed under H0) equaled 0.57 with a corresponding Prob>chi2 of 0.7509). Hence,
strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of non-normality of the errors.
5. We test a variance component for which the alternative hypothesis is one-sided. Negative
variances, which exist under a two-sided test, do not apply.
Notes on contributors
Jan Wynen (PhD in public administration) is an assistant professor at the Tilburg School of
Economics and Management (the Netherlands) and affiliated to the Research Group on Politics &
Public Governance, within the Department of Politics, University of Antwerp (Belgium). His
research focuses on the effect of repetitive changes on public sector organizations. He has published
extensively in a wide array of journals (e.g., Public Administration Review, Public Management
Review, Tourism Management, Public Administration, International Public Management Journal,
and Review of Public Personnel Administration).
Bjorn Kleizen, LLM, MSc, is a doctoral student at the University of Antwerp, Faculty of Social
Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Research Group Politics & Public Governance. His
research interests include the psychological and organizational-level effects of repeated
18 J. WYNEN ET AL.
organizational change, EU law, and EU foreign policy. To that end, he has published social-scientific
and legal research in various journals, including Public Administration, Public Management Review,
and Journal of European Public Policy.
Koen Verhoest (PhD in public administration) is research professor in public administration at the
Research Group on Politics & Public Governance, within the Department of Politics, University of
Antwerp (Belgium). His research focuses on autonomy, control and coordination of (regulatory)
agencies, on multilevel regulation in liberalized markets as well as on collaboration through public–
private partnerships. He has published widely on these issues in international top journals such as
Regulation & Governance, Organization Studies, and Public Management Review as well as five
international books with Palgrave Macmillan and Edward Elgar.
Per Lægreid is professor at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of
Bergen. He has published extensively on public sector reforms in Journal such as Public Management
Review, Public Administration Review, and Public Administration. His recent co-edited books
include Nordic Administrative Reforms. Lessons for Public (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) and Societal
Security and Crisis Management. Governance Capacity and Legitimacy (PalgraveMacmillan 2018).
Vidar Rolland, Special Adviser at NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Responsible for The
Norwegian State Administration Database (NSAD).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
[VENI].
References
Allen, T. D., D. M. Freeman, J. E. A. Russell, R. C. Reizenstein, and J. O. Rentz. 2001. “Survivor
Reactions to Organizational Downsizing: Does Time Ease the Pain?” Journal of Occupational and
Organizational Psychology 74 (2): 145–164. doi:10.1348/096317901167299.
Amabile, T. M., and R. Conti. 1999. “Changes in the Work Environment for Creativity during
Downsizing.” The Academy of Management Journal 42 (6): 630–640.
Amiot, C. E., D. J. Terry, N. L. Jimmieson, and V. J. Callan. 2006. “A Longitudinal Investigation of
Coping Processes during A Merger: Implications for Job Satisfaction and Organizational
Identification.” Journal of Management 32 (4): 552–574. doi:10.1177/0149206306287542.
Axtell, C. M., D. J. Holman, K. L. Unsworth, T. D. Wall, P. E. Waterson, and E. Harrington. 2000.
“Shopfloor Innovation: Facilitating the Suggestion and Implementation of Ideas.” Journal of
Occupational and Organizational Psychology 73 (3): 265–285. doi:10.1348/096317900167029.
Bommer, M., and D. S. Jalajas. 1999. “The Threat of Organizational Downsizing on the Innovative
Propensity of R&D Professionals.” R&DManagement 29 (1): 27–34. doi:10.1111/1467-9310.00114.
Borins, S. 2001. “Encouraging Innovation in The Public Sector.” Journal of Intellectual Capital 2 (3):
310–319.
Chiu, R. K. 2003. “Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role
of Locus of Control.” Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1–2): 65–74. doi:10.1023/A:1022911215204.
D’Aunno, T., and R. I. Sutton. 1992. “The Responses of Drug Abuse Treatment Organizations to
Financial Adversity: A Partial Test of the Threat-Rigidity Thesis.” Journal of Management 18 (1):
117–131. doi:10.1177/014920639201800108.
Daly, A. J., C. Der-Martirosian, C. Ong-Dean, V. Park, and A. Wishard-Guerra. 2011. “Leading under
Sanction: Principals’ Perceptions of Threat Rigidity, Efficacy and Leadership in Underperforming
Schools.” Leadership and Policy in Schools 10 (2): 171–206. doi:10.1080/15700763.2011.557517.
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 19
Damanpour, F. 1991. “Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Determinants and
Moderators.” Academy of Management Journal 34 (3): 555–590.
De Graaf, G. 2010. “A Report on Reporting: Why Peers Report Integrity and Law Violations in Public
Organizations.” Public Administration Review 70 (5): 767–779. doi:10.1111/puar.2010.70.issue-5.
Farjoun, M., and W. H. Starbuck. 2005. “Synopsis: NASA, the CAIB Report, and the Columbia
Disaster.” In Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster, edited by
W. H. Starbuck and M. Farjoun, 1–18. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Greasley, S., and C. Hanretty. 2014. “Credibility and Agency Termination under Parliamentarism.”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26 (1): 159–173.
Greve, C., P. Lægreid, and L. H. Rykkja. 2016. “The Nordic Model Revisited.” In Nordic
Administrative Reforms: Lessons for Public Management, edited by C. Greve, P. Lægreid, and
L. H. Rykkja, 189–212. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Grunberg, L., S. Moore, E. S. Greenberg, and P. Sikora. 2008. “The Changing Workplace and Its
Effects: A Longitudinal Examination of Employee Responses at a Large Company.” The Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science 44 (2): 215–236.. doi:10.1177/0021886307312771.
Hajnal, G. 2012. “Studying Dynamics of Government Agencies: Conceptual and Methodological
Results of a Hungarian Organizational Mapping Exercise.” International Journal of Public
Administration 35 (12): 832–843. doi:10.1080/01900692.2012.715564.
Hassan, S. 2015. “The Importance of Ethical Leadership and Personal Control in Promoting
Improvement-Centered Voice among Government Employees.” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 25 (3): 697–719. doi:10.1093/jopart/muu055.
Hetland, H., and G. Sandal. 2003. “Transformational Leadership in Norway: Outcomes and
Personality Correlates.” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 12 (2):
147–170. doi:10.1080/13594320344000057.
Hofstede, G. 1980. Cultures and Organizations. London: McGraw-Hill.
Jain, A. K. 2015. “An Interpersonal Perspective to Study Silence in Indian Organizations:
Investigation of Dimensionality and Development of Measures.” Personnel Review 44 (6):
1010–1036. doi:10.1108/PR-12-2013-0220.
Kiewitz, C., S. L. D. Restubog, M. K. Shoss, P. R. J. Garcia, and R. L. Tang. 2016. “Suffering in
Silence: Investigating the Role of Fear in the Relationship between Abusive Supervision and
Defensive Silence.” Journal of Applied Psychology 101 (5): 731–742. doi:10.1037/apl0000074.
Kim, T., D. M. Cable, and S. Kim. 2005. “Socialization Tactics, Employee Proactivity and
Person-Organization Fit.” Journal of Applied Psychology 90 (2): 232–241. doi:10.1037/0021-
9010.90.2.232.
Kuipers, S., K. Yesilkagit, and B. Carroll. 2018. “Coming to Terms with Agency Termination.” Public
Organization Review 18 (2): 263–278. doi:10.1007/s11115-017-0376-4.
Lægreid, P., P. G. Roness, and K. Rubecksen. 2012. “Norway.” In Government Agencies: Practices and
Lessons from 30 Countries, edited by K. Verhoest, S. Van Thiel, G. Bouckaert, and P. Lægreid,
234–244. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lewis, D. 2002. “Whistleblowing Procedures at Work: What are the Implications for Human Resource
Practitioners?” Business Ethics: a European Review 11 (3): 202–209. doi:10.1111/beer.2002.11.issue-3.
MacCarthaigh, M. 2012. “Mapping and Understanding Organizational Change: Ireland 1922–2010.”
International Journal of Public Administration 35 (12): 795-807.
MacCarthaigh, M., and P. Roness. 2012. “Analyzing Longitudinal Continuity and Change in Public
Sector Organizations.” International Journal of Public Administration 35 (12): 773–782.
doi:10.1080/01900692.2012.715567.
Milliken, F. J., E. W. Morrison, and P. F. Hewlin. 2003. “An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence:
Issues that Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why.” Journal of Management Studies
40 (6): 1453–1475. doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00387.
Moore, S., L. Grunberg, and E. Greenberg. 2004. “Repeated Downsizing Contact: The Effects of
Similar and Dissimilar Layoff Experiences on Work and Well-Being Outcomes.” Journal of
Occupational Health Psychology 9 (3): 247–257. doi:10.1037/1076-8998.9.3.247.
Moorhead, G., R. Ference, and C. P. Neck. 1991. “Group Decision Fiascoes Continue: Space Shuttle
Challenger and a Revised Groupthink Framework.” Human Relations 44 (6): 539–550.
Morrison, E. W. 2011. “Employee Voice Behavior: Integration and Directions for Future Research.”
Academy of Management Annals 5 (1): 373–412. doi:10.5465/19416520.2011.574506.
20 J. WYNEN ET AL.
Muurlink, O., A.Wilkinson, D. Peetz, and K. Townsend. 2012. “Managerial Autism: Threat-Rigidity and
Rigidity’s Threat.” British Journal of Management 23: S74–S87. doi:10.1111/bjom.2012.23.issue-s1.
Olsen, B., and D. Sexton. 2009. “Threat Rigidity, School Reform, and How Teachers View Their
Work inside Current Education Policy Contexts.” American Educational Research Journal 46 (9):
9–44. doi:10.3102/0002831208320573.
Pinder, C. C., and K. P. Harlos. 2001. “Employee Silence: Quiescence and Acquiescence as Responses
to Perceived Injustice.” Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management 20: 331–369.
Pollitt, C. 2007. “New Labour’s Re-Disorganization.” Public Management Review 9 (4): 529–543.
doi:10.1080/14719030701726663.
Premeaux, S. F., and A. G. Bedeian. 2003. “Breaking the Silence: The Moderating Effects of
Self-Monitoring in Predicting Speaking up in the Workplace.” Journal of Management Studies
40 (6): 1537–1561. doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00390.
Rafferty, A. E., and M. A. Griffin. 2006. “Perceptions of Organizational Change: A Stress and Coping
Perspective.” Journal of Applied Psychology 91 (5): 1154–1162. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.91.5.1154.
Rafferty, A. E., and S. L. D. Restubog. 2017. “Why Do Employees’ Perceptions of Their
Organization’s Change History Matter? the Role of Change Appraisals.” Human Resource
Management 56 (3): 533–550. doi:10.1002/hrm.21782.
Rhee, J., A. Dedahanov, and D. Lee. 2014. “Relationships among Power Distance, Collectivism,
Punishment, and Acquiescent, Defensive, or Prosocial Silence.” Social Behavior and Personality
42 (5): 705–720. doi:10.2224/sbp.2014.42.5.705.
Schouten, B., J. Bethlehem, K. Beullens, O. Kleven, G. Loosveldt, A. Luiten, K. Rutar, N. Shlomo, and
C. Skinner. 2012. “Evaluating, Comparing, Monitoring and Improving Representativeness of
Survey Response through R-Indicators and Partial R-Indicators.” International Statistical
Review 80 (3): 382–399. doi:10.1111/j.1751-5823.2012.00189.x.
Seo, M., and N. S. Hill. 2005. “Understanding the Human Side of Merger and Acquisition: An
Integrative Framework.” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 41 (4): 422–443. doi:10.1177/
0021886305281902.
Staw, B. M., L. E. Sandelands, and D. E. Dutton. 1981. “Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior:
A Multilevel Analysis.” Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (4): 501–524. doi:10.2307/2392337.
Steenbergen, M., and B. S. Jones. 2002. “Modeling Multilevel Data Structures.” American Journal of
Political Science 46: 218–237.
Vakola, M., and D. Bouradas. 2005. “Antecedents and Consequences of Organizational Silence: An
Empirical Investigation.” Employee Relations 27 (5): 441–458. doi:10.1108/01425450510611997.
Van Dyne, L., S. Ang, and I. S. Botero. 2003. “Conceptualizing Employee Silence and Employee
Voice as Multidimensional Constructs.” Journal of Management Studies 40 (6): 1359–1392.
doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00384.
Van Thiel, S. 2012. “Comparing Agencies across Countries.” In Government Agencies: Practices and
Lessons from 30 Countries, edited by K. Verhoest, S. Van Thiel, G. Bouckaert, and P. Laegreid,
18–28. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vigoda-Gadot, E., and I. Beeri. 2011. “Change-Oriented Organizational Citizenship Behavior in
Public Administration: The Power of Leadership and the Cost of Organizational Politics.” Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 (3): 573–590. doi:10.1093/jopart/mur036.
Walumbwa, F. O., and J. Schaubroeck. 2009. “Leader Personality Traits and Employee Voice
Behavior: Mediating Roles of Ethical Leadership and Work Group Psychological Safety.”
Journal of Applied Psychology 94 (5): 1275–1286. doi:10.1037/a0015848.
Wang, Y. D., and H. H. Hsieh. 2013. “Organizational Ethical Climate, Perceived Organizational
Support, and Employee Silence: A Cross-Level Investigation.” Human Relations 66 (6): 783–802.
doi:10.1177/0018726712460706.
Wynen, J., K. Verhoest, and B. Kleizen. 2017. “More Reforms, Less Innovation? the Impact of
Structural Reform Histories on Innovation-Oriented Cultures in Public Organizations.” Public
Management Review 19 (8): 1142–1164. doi:10.1080/14719037.2016.1266021.
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 21
Appendix









Age Gender Age Gender
Statistics Norway 1155 3,96 1,42 3,66 1,43
Norwegian Competition Authority 1168 3,17 1,33 3,00 1,33
Directorate of Taxes 1193 3,60 1,31 3,47 1,47
Directorate of Norwegian Customs 1408 3,92 1,60 3,88 1,51
Financial Supervisory Authority 1535 3,74 1,32 3,75 1,44
Norwegian Government Agency for Financial
Management
1616 4,29 1,41 4,00 1,49
Norwegian Maritime Directorate 2012 3,52 1,19 3,75 1,29
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 2801 3,79 1,33 3,80 1,35
Norwegian Patent Office 2802 3,24 1,41 3,19 1,54
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2813 4,42 1,33 4,05 1,55
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 4802 4,22 1,59 4,06 1,57
Norwegian National Security Authority (NoNSA) 5814 3,36 1,25 3,53 1,32
Directorate of Fisheries 6801 3,96 1,25 3,78 1,40
Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) 6802 4,12 1,29 4,10 1,27
Norwegian Board of Health Supervision 7012 4,38 1,50 4,35 1,59
Norwegian Medicines Agency 7668 3,68 1,50 3,68 1,60
Norwegian Directorate of Health (central unit) 7674 3,71 1,51 3,71 1,55
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority 7806 4,00 1,77 3,67 1,70
Directorate of Public Roads 8801 4,16 1,34 4,04 1,39
Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) 8805 3,77 1,15 3,56 1,29
Norwegian Railway Inspectorate 8807 3,67 1,33 3,63 1,38
Norwegian National Rail Administration 8808 3,80 1,16 3,80 1,28
Civil Aviation Authority 8813 4,33 1,42 4,23 1,32
Directorate for buidling quality 9805 2,83 1,50 2,93 1,33
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 9806 3,48 1,59 3,41 1,60
Data Inspectorate 13,505 3,50 1,33 3,44 1,44
National Police Directorate 13,655 3,94 1,50 3,85 1,44
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 13,659 3,95 1,44 3,88 1,45
Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family
Affairs
18,603 3,73 1,59 3,56 1,64
Norwegian Food Safety Authority 19,691 3,97 1,57 3,88 1,61
Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management 19,804 3,81 1,13 3,76 1,29
Norwegian Agricultural Authority 19,828 3,93 1,47 3,54 1,42
Climate and Pollution Agency 20,501 3,39 1,61 3,58 1,58
Arts Council Norway 21,522 4,00 1,63 4,00 1,64
Directorate for Cultural Heritage 21,528 4,14 1,48 4,02 1,49
Norwegian Gaming Board 26,611 3,33 1,50 3,56 1,56
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 29,603 4,30 1,20 4,02 1,34
Norwegian Media Authority 34,604 4,13 1,38 4,17 1,50
Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training 35,603 3,60 1,57 3,60 1,62
Directorate for Education and Training 38,602 3,63 1,50 3,72 1,50
NAV- Directorate of Labour 38,612 3,67 1,54 3,72 1,52
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Table A2. Structural reforms cited in the Norwegian state administration database.
Founding events Maintenance Events Ending events
Regular founding Maintenance by secession Ending by absorption
Founding by secession Maintenance by absorption Ending by splitting
Founding by splitting Change in name Ending with a merger
Founding by a merger Change in location Pure disband
Founding by complex
reorganization
Maintenance by reorganization Ending by complex
reorganization
Entered; new relevant entity New line of reporting Discharged; no longer
a relevant entity
New superior organization (horizontal
movement)
New affiliation/administrative level
New superior organization and level
No change to units, but a change in
superiors
Units moving into or out of integrated
organizations
For more information see http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/data/en/forvaltning/internendring
Table A3. COFOG Coding.
COFOG Description Frequency (% of organizations)
1 General public services 14
2 Defense 4
3 Public order and safety 8
4 Economic affairs 43
5 Environmental protection 4
6 Housing and community amenities 2
7 Health 6
8 Recreation, culture and religion 6
9 Education 2
10 Social Protection 10
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Used survey questions for:
Dependent:
Have you, during the past year, put aside program proposals, draft laws, regulations, etc. within
your area because there was controversy about these?
Have you, during the past year, failed to raise a problem/matter within your area because you
assumed that there would be a dispute about it
Independents:
Age: What is your age?
Gender: Sex?
Position: What is your current job level?
Tenure: How long have you been employed in the current organization?
Startingjob: At what level was your first job in this agency central?
Rules: Are there clear rules or well-established practices regarding the performance of your
work tasks?
Task: Which of the following tasks does the bulk of your work fall into?
Joboffers: Have you received any direct offers/inquiries regarding new posts during the
past year?
Study abroad: Do you have education abroad for at least one year?
Language: What language do you use daily?
Importance-Loyalty: What weight do you add to each of the following considerations in
carrying out your work tasks? Loyalty to the immediate superior
Importance- Professional: What weight do you add to each of the following considerations
in carrying out your work tasks? Professional Considerations
Importance- Law: What weight do you add to each of the following considerations in
carrying out your work tasks? Judicial proceedings, current law
Political: Are you currently, or have you been a member of any political party?
Attitude to superior: Do you want to send up a proposal you personally think is correct if
you also know (or assume) that the proposal will encounter concerns of your superior?
Full correlation matrix:
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Table A6. Variance inflation factor.
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared
Defensive silence (q1) 1.63 1.28 0.6148 0.3852
Defensive silence (q2) 1.64 1.28 0.6092 0.3908
Age 1.20 1.10 0.8299 0.1701
Gender 1.06 1.03 0.9453 0.0547
Position 1.54 1.24 0.6505 0.3495
Tenure 1.14 1.07 0.8757 0.1243
Startingjob 1.45 1.20 0.6908 0.3092
Rules 1.11 1.05 0.9031 0.0969
Task 1.02 1.01 0.9763 0.0237
Studiedabroad 1.03 1.02 0.9686 0.0314
Joboffers 1.04 1.02 0.9571 0.0429
Attitude to superior 1.07 1.03 0.9374 0.0626
Language 1.04 1.02 0.9583 0.0417
Loyalty 1.07 1.03 0.9347 0.0653
Professional 1.13 1.06 0.8844 0.1156
Procedure 1.18 1.08 0.8502 0.1498
Political engagement 1.05 1.03 0.9490 0.0510
Mean VIF 1.20
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